

Introduction to *Case, animacy and semantic roles*

Please cite this paper as:

Kittilä, Seppo, Katja Västi and Jussi Ylikoski. (2011) Introduction to case, animacy and semantic roles. In: Kittilä, Seppo, Katja Västi & Jussi Ylikoski (Eds.), *Case, Animacy and Semantic Roles*, 1-26. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Seppo Kittilä

University of Helsinki

Katja Västi

University of Oulu

University of Helsinki

Jussi Ylikoski

University of Helsinki

1. Introduction

Case, animacy and semantic roles and different combinations thereof have been the topic of numerous studies in linguistics (see e.g. Næss 2003; Kittilä 2008; de Hoop & de Swart 2008 among numerous others). The current volume adds to this list. The focus of the chapters in this volume lies on the effects that animacy has on the use and interpretation of cases and semantic roles.

Each of the three concepts discussed in this volume can also be seen as somewhat problematic and not always easy to define. First, as noted by Butt (2006: 1), we still have not reached a full consensus on what *case* is and how it differs, for example, from

the closely related concept of adpositions. Second, *animacy*, as the label is used in linguistics, does not fully correspond to a layperson's concept of animacy, which is probably rather biology-based (see e.g. Yamamoto 1999 for a discussion of the concept of animacy). The label can therefore, if desired, be seen as a misnomer. Lastly, *semantic roles* can be considered one of the most notorious labels in linguistics, as has been recently discussed by Newmeyer (2010). There is still no full consensus on how the concept of semantic roles is best defined and what would be the correct or necessary number of semantic roles necessary for a full description of languages. However, there is some consensus on the core roles, and, for example, the roles of Agent and Patient are rather non-controversially assumed.

Even though we are aware of the potential problems associated with the concepts discussed in the chapters of this book, it is not our goal to discuss the theoretical grounds or universal validity of such notions. Rather, the chapters of this book discuss the concepts from perspectives that have not been in the mainstream of studies dealing with these topics. We especially hope that this book will make an important contribution to how animacy affects the coding of semantic roles and how animacy and case relate to each other. It is therefore worth noting that the chapters in this volume do not deal with, for example, the widely discussed Differential Object or Subject Marking, but the focus lies on less studied instances of animacy-determined marking.

The organization of this introductory chapter is as follows. In Section 2, the multifaceted nature of the title concepts will be discussed. As noted above, it is not the goal of this chapter to revolutionize our understanding of case, animacy and semantic

roles, but it is nevertheless important to discuss this in order to do justice to previous studies of these topics. Section 3 deals with semantic roles and cases. This means that we will briefly discuss some relevant aspects of how semantic roles can be coded by cases as well as adpositions, wherever the dividing line can be drawn. Section 4 is devoted to discussing the interplay between animacy and semantic roles. It will be shown that certain roles are more readily borne by animate entities, while others are rather seen as inanimate roles, which can be easily accounted for by the nature of the roles. Section 5 deals with animacy and case and shows how certain cases occur typically with animate nouns, while others are more common with inanimate arguments. Finally, Section 6 provides a brief introduction to the individual chapters in this book.

2. Defining the concepts

The three concepts discussed in the chapters of this volume have been given various definitions depending on who has defined the labels and for what purpose. In this section, we will briefly illustrate how the concepts have been defined. This is relevant to the discussion in the subsequent sections. The discussion of the concepts below follows their order in the title of the book.

2.1. *Case*

Case constitutes one of the linguistic phenomena studied extensively by various scholars from a variety of perspectives. Recent studies include titles such as *Case* (Blake 2001), *Theories of Case* (Butt 2006) and *The Oxford Handbook of Case* (Malchukov & Spencer (eds) 2009). *Case* is of interest to both functional-typological linguistics and also to more formally oriented frameworks.

One of the natural consequences of the intensive study of case is that the concept has been defined in a variety of ways. Three rather illustrative definitions are found below:

In the past, research on ‘case’ has amounted to an examination of the variety of semantic relationships which can hold between nouns and other portions of sentences (...) (Fillmore 1968: 2)

Case is a system of marking dependent nouns for the type of relationship they bear to their heads. Traditionally the term refers to inflectional marking, and, typically, case marks the relationship of a noun to a verb at the clause level or of a noun to a preposition, postposition or another noun at the phrase level. (Blake 2001: 1; boldface original)

Case: an inflectional dimension of nouns that serves to code the noun phrase's semantic role. (Haspelmath 2002: 267; boldface original)

One of the things that recur in the definitions, including those provided above, is that case is defined as a relation that a noun bears to the verb. This is usually taken to mean that this relation must be somehow definable in semantic terms and this relation must be systematic. For example, the accusative marker can be defined as an affix that attaches to the constituent marking the Patient (or in more general terms, the less active of the participants of a two-participant scene). On the other hand, elements that mark only, for example, pragmatic functions such as salience and topicality are usually not considered instances of case (but see Næss, this volume). Consequently, in the examples below, only *ga* and *o* are considered case markers, while *wa* is not. Consider:

(1) Japanese (Nobufumi Inaba, p.c.)

a. *kare-ga otoko-o koroshita*

he-NOM man-ACC kill.PST

'He killed the man.'

b. *kare wa otoko-o koroshita*

he TOP man-ACC kill.PST

'He killed the man.'

c. *otoko wa kare-ga koroshita*

man TOP he-NOM kill.PST

‘He killed the man.’

The main difference between the markers above is that *ga* and *o* are used for coding semantic relations in a systematic way, while *wa* can mark any constituent regarded as topic in a given context. Consequently, *wa* is not typically seen as a case marker in Japanese. The simple definitions above suffice for the chapters of this volume, although in two chapters (Næss and Lestrade), the theoretical definition of case is approached from a somewhat novel perspective.

Second, case is closely related to adposition. Both express similar functions, e.g., coding semantic roles. However, the two concepts are not identical and there are certain formal differences between them. In principle, case markers are affixes and as such attach tightly to their hosts and may, for example, cause morphophonological changes in them. Adpositions, in turn, are seen rather as independent constituents, and they do not usually trigger any changes in the nouns they modify. However, this is not a universally valid definition, as shown also by the lack of fully established ways to analyze the Japanese grammatical morphemes in (1). A detailed discussion of the formal differences between case and adposition lies outside the scope of this volume.

In most of the articles of this book, the semantic and functional differences between cases and adpositions are more relevant than their morphology. Although cases and adpositions have features in common and can both be used to express semantic roles of many kinds, there are obvious differences in the nature of the roles typically expressed by cases and those expressed by adpositions. As a generalization it holds that

adpositions are semantically more specific, whereas cases are more abstract in nature (especially if a language has both; see e.g. Comrie 1986). This is manifested, for example, by the fact that cases usually code central participants, such as Agent, Patient and Recipient, while adpositions rather code more peripheral roles, such as different types of location. Needless to say, there are languages in which cases also code Location and in which adpositions code Recipient and Instrument and even Agent and Patient. However, languages in which peripheral roles are coded by cases, while adpositions are used for expressing core functions are rare, if they exist at all. Languages with rich case inventories also have “quirky cases” expressing functions not typical of cases, such as aversive (‘for the fear of’) and egressive (‘all the way from’).

Cases can further be roughly divided into two categories based on their syntactic-semantic nature; we can speak of so-called grammatical and semantic cases (see Haspelmath 2009: 508 for a more detailed discussion of this and other similar concepts). Grammatical cases comprise cases such as nominative, accusative, absolutive and ergative. These cases typically code core grammatical relations such as subject and object (if a language has them), which has the consequence that these cases are semantically rather vacuous and they derive their meaning largely from the verb. Semantic (or adverbial) cases, such as instrumental, comitative and locative cases, for their part, are semantically richer and thus less dependent on the verb. However, some cases, such as many of those labeled as datives, are borderline cases, having features of both semantic and grammatical cases. Finally, adpositions are semantically independent and an adposition usually (but not always) retains its function irrespective

of the verb it appears with.¹ Thus, a continuum ranging from semantically empty grammatical cases to semantically specific (and “grammatically empty”) adpositions can be proposed, as shown in Figure 1:




Figure 1. Grammatical cases, semantic cases and adpositions

For example, the Finnish nominative case can code (at least) seven widely established semantic roles, namely Agent, Force, Experiencer, Patient, Stimulus, Theme and Instrument. The allative, for its part, can code, for example, Recipient, Beneficiary and Goal (but see Västi, this volume, for a more detailed discussion of the participant roles coded by the allative). Finally, semantically most specific adpositions possibly code only one role, just as the Finnish ambiposition (pre- and postposition) *ennen* ‘before’ only codes one role, namely Time (but, unlike *before*, usually not Location).

The differences in the semantic specificity of the elements of Figure 1 can, at least to some extent, be explained by the fact that cases (especially semantic ones) often originate from adpositions (see Ylikoski, this volume, and references therein). As is typical of grammaticalization in general, elements that partake in grammaticalization undergo different degrees of semantic bleaching and reanalysis. Based on this, it is to

¹ This generalization holds only if a language has both cases and adpositions.

be expected that case markers have lost something of their original semantics, which makes it possible for them to adopt new functions. These differences are relevant to the chapters of this volume as well, and semantic and functional differences between cases and adpositions are discussed by Kittilä and Ylikoski, Klavan et al., Luraghi and Sirola-Belliard.

2.2. *Animacy*

Animacy can, in principle, be defined in two different ways. First, the term may be used in a biological sense, in which case basically all living entities can be seen as animate, while all other entities are inanimate. In other words, women, men and dogs are animate, while tables, windows and rocks are inanimate. Second, the label can be given a linguistic definition, in which case the definition is used in a narrower sense. Linguistic animacy is typically defined based on an entity's ability to act or instigate events volitionally and on how this is manifested formally in languages. Humans are regarded as the most animate entities as they are, for example, capable of feelings and instigating events with intent. Many entities, such as worms or sponges (not to speak of plants, fungi or bacteria), are not animate linguistically, since their formal treatment differs from higher animates. In what follows, we will briefly elaborate on animacy in the sense this label is generally used in linguistics (cf., for example, Yamamoto 1999: 9-22).

In the most evident cases, as in the case of differences between humans and tables, biological and linguistic animacy coincide; humans are animate both biologically and linguistically, while tables are not. However, languages also make finer-grained distinctions, that is, the degree of animacy accorded to different entities linguistically varies. Humans rank the highest for animacy followed by higher animals (such as dogs and horses), while lower animals (worms, flies, etc.) are usually treated as inanimate entities. Secondly, and more importantly for any study dealing with linguistic animacy, a single entity may be referred to in a variety of ways, which may have drastic consequences for the linguistic, but not biological, animacy of the entity in question. A single entity may be referred to in multiple ways. For example, any human may be referred to by first, second and third person pronouns, by their names and by nouns (woman, child, teacher, etc.). These may differ radically in their linguistic animacy, as briefly discussed above, without this having any consequences for their biological animacy. Typically, these different ways of referring to non-linguistic entities are presented in the form of a hierarchy, such as those below. These following hierarchies are from Croft (2003: 310), but the concept was first discussed by Silverstein (1976):

Person: first, second < third

Referentiality: pronoun < proper name < common noun

Animacy: human < animate < inanimate

Hierarchies, such as those above, can be said to be based on the likelihood of a referent to act as an Agent in an event. As noted by Dixon (1994: 23), we speak of things we do to others rather than things happening or done to ourselves. From this it follows that first (and second) person pronoun referents are the most likely Agents in events, while inanimate entities are the least likely Agents. Inanimate entities, such as table, tree and plate, are the least probable Agents due to their inability to instigate events volitionally.

One of the consequences of the discrepancies between biological and linguistic animacy is that certain authors avoid the term animacy and speak rather of empathy hierarchies (see Yamamoto 1999: 10-11). This is understandable, since we are not dealing with genuine differences in animacy between first and second person pronouns, since their referents are almost exclusively animate biologically (see also Filimonova 2005: 83). The same applies to referentiality; the way of referring to an entity does not affect its biological animacy. In this sense, the label *animacy* can be regarded as a misnomer and the use of other labels is only natural and perhaps even favored. The label *empathy hierarchies* means that the higher a referent ranks, the more empathy we have for it. We naturally have the most empathy for ourselves and the least for (biologically as well as linguistically) inanimate entities, which makes the label rather readily applicable. However, despite these potential problems with the label, the term animacy will be used in the chapters of this book. Moreover, only the linguistic animacy of entities is relevant to the discussion here; biological animacy is in the background, which makes it possible to use the label as it is. What makes linguistic animacy an interesting research topic is that explicit marking of animacy for individual

nouns can be seen as fully redundant (in other words, it is well known that women, men and children are animate, while tables, rocks and pens are not), but animacy nevertheless has many formal consequences. However, it must be noted that many nouns, such as *school* or *company*, may be seen as both animate and inanimate depending on context.

2.3. *Semantic roles*

As noted by Newmeyer (2010: 689), *semantic roles* are one of the most notorious concepts in linguistics. According to him, semantic roles have been defined in dozens of different ways, and there is still no consensus on how the terms should be defined. Newmeyer points to problems of defining single roles and also to cases in which a single participant may bear more than one role. Theories of semantic roles are thus open to criticism due to the risk of idiosyncrasy of the definitions; every scholar has the freedom of defining the roles as he/she sees fit, which makes it harder to compare the results of different studies with each other. Different scholars may use different criteria for distinguishing between the roles. It is therefore very difficult, if not impossible, to give the exact right number of roles necessary for an exhaustive description of a language or languages. Moreover, the definition above easily accounts for the central roles of events, such as Agent, Patient and Recipient, but it runs into trouble with marginal, less easily definable roles. For example, what are the roles of the participants in events such as ‘the voice echoes through the forest’ and is it

necessary to make a distinction between different subtypes of Location, as in ‘the child put the book on/under/behind/near the table’? Moreover, one must ask which roles need to be identified to begin with. The less clearly defined roles especially lend themselves to *ad hoc* definitions, which has the unfortunate consequence that the number of roles is in principle indefinite.

However, despite partly agreeing with Newmeyer on the criticisms he presents, we think that the concept of semantic roles is useful, and even necessary, in functionally oriented studies of argument marking, but the concept should be used with caution. Put simply, semantic roles are in this book approached as the different functions participants have in events. For example, in the event described by the sentence *Fritz broke the window with a hammer*, the instigator of the event, namely Fritz, is the Agent, the affected participant (window) the Patient, and the hammer is the Instrument because the Agent manipulates it in order to cause a change in the Patient. This is the usual way of defining semantic roles in basic linguistic theory, and such definitions are widely used in functional-typological studies of argument marking.

The kind of approach presented above probably constitutes the best starting point for cross-linguistic studies of argument marking, since they do not depend on any formal criteria and thus they do not confine the discussion to any specific type of clausal constituents. They consequently make it possible to study the coding of arguments in formally diverse languages. For example, the Agent does not need to appear in the nominative case or the Patient in the accusative case in order to be considered. The exact definition of the roles varies, but the basic methodology is

largely the same irrespective of the author who has defined the roles. For example, certain authors may not distinguish between different kinds of Agent, while others may speak of proto-Agent, Involuntary Agent and Force depending on the exact nature of the instigator/causer of an event.

The idiosyncratic nature of the definitions briefly noted above also yields other kinds of problems. It is not always easy to challenge the definitions, because they are semantically based, the criteria used may differ and new criteria may be added whenever new data makes this necessary. Therefore, more formal descriptions have also been applied. This kind of definition has been adopted, for example, by Næss (2007), who defines the roles based on three features, namely instigation [INST], volitionality [VOL] and affectedness [AFF]. For example, Agent and Patient are defined as below:

Agent [+INST] [+VOL] [-AFF]

Patient [-INST] [-VOL] [+AFF]

This kind of definition is easier to challenge, because the features employed are made very explicit. This kind of explicitness makes it easier to highlight the feature responsible for distinguishing between two roles. However, the problem of idiosyncrasy does not disappear completely, since the author is responsible for choosing the features for his/her description, which may naturally vary drastically

between authors. Also, the binary nature of the features may yield problems, as Næss herself readily admits.

In the chapters of this volume, the concept of semantic roles is seen as unproblematic, despite the problems any definition unarguably has. There are two main reasons for adopting this approach. First, all of the chapters in this volume (with the exception of Västi and possibly Kittilä and Ylikoski) deal with rather clear cases of well-established roles. The risk of *ad hoc* formulations is thus very low. Second, it is not the goal of this volume to challenge the existing definitions of semantic roles, but to contribute to our understanding of the interplay of semantic roles with animacy and case. Therefore, the pre-existing theories and definitions suffice for the purposes of this volume.

3. Cases and semantic roles

In this section, we will illustrate how cases are used for coding semantic roles. As noted above, cases are both functionally and formally close to adpositions, so coding by case is contrasted below with coding by adpositions in order to reach a better understanding of what case is. In other words, we will briefly discuss what kinds of semantic roles are typically coded by cases and which are coded rather by adpositions. The focus of the section lies on functional differences between cases and adpositions. It is not the goal of this section to contribute to our understanding of the formal

differences between cases and adpositions. Moreover, it must be noted that the exact morphological nature of the element labeled as case marker is not fundamental here.

Basically, semantic roles may be coded by cases, adpositions and word order.
Consider:

- (2) Camling (Sino-Tibetan; Ebert 1997: 46)

khu-wa lungto-wa pucho(-lai) set-yu*

he-ERG stone-INS snake(*-DAT) kill-3

‘He killed a snake with a stone.’

- (3) Icelandic (Jóhanna Barðdal, p.c.)

hann lagði bílnum fyrir mig

he.NOM park.PST car.ACC for 1SG.ACC

‘He parked the car for me.’

- (4) English

a. *the man killed the bear*

b. *the bear killed the man*

Camling and Icelandic exemplify languages in which certain semantic roles are coded by cases. In Camling, Agent is coded by the ergative, Instrument occurs in the instrumental case, while animate and definite Patients optionally bear dative coding

(not possible for lower animates, such as snakes). In Icelandic, Themes/Patients are marked by the accusative case, while Beneficiary is coded by an adposition, as shown in (3). English uses the same mechanism for Beneficiary coding, as shown by the translation of (3). Finally, in (4) from English, only the order of the arguments determines their semantic roles; in (4a), the man is the Agent, and the bear the Patient, while in (b) the roles are reversed. The only difference between (4a) and (4b) is found in the order of elements; there is no nominal marking available for this.

The very brief illustration in (2)-(4) naturally only scratches the surface of how semantic roles are coded by cases, but a more detailed discussion of this lies outside the scope of this chapter. As was noted above, and as the examples in (2)-(4) show, cases and adpositions have features in common. Both of them are used for coding semantic roles. However, cases and adpositions sometimes differ significantly according to what kind of semantic roles they tend to code. As a generalization it holds that core semantic roles are most likely coded by cases, while peripheral roles usually receive adpositional coding in the event that a language has both. For example, Agents, Patients and Recipients are typically coded by cases, while specific instances of Location and Manner tend to be adpositionally coded. Needless to say, the number of cases available in a language is crucial in this respect, and the higher the number of cases, the higher the number of different roles coded by them. But the point pursued here is that the further one proceeds from the core roles, the more probable adpositional coding becomes. Moreover, there is no language in which Location, Instrument and Maleficiary (all of which constitute peripheral roles that do not need to

be explicitly referred to) would receive coding by case, while core roles, such as Agent, Patient and Recipient would be coded adpositionally. Below, we will outline some reasons for this.

First, one possible (yet in this context speculative) reason for the type of division of labor noted above is found in the frequency of occurrence and its relation to grammaticalization. Cases more typically code core participants that are integral parts of the events in question. When we speak of events, we somehow need to account for the participants obligatorily present, while specifying the nature of peripheral participants, such as Instrument and Location, is more optional. This has the natural consequence that constituents referring to core participants are much more frequent than those referring to optional constituents. Frequency of occurrence plays a very important role in grammaticalization, which in this context means that markers of core roles have developed into case affixes, while optional constituents more typically bear adpositional coding. Moreover, markers of grammatical cases tend to be materially lighter than the markers of semantic cases. For example, in Veps, the terminative case ending is *-hasai* ('until; up to'), while the genitive-accusative marker is *-n*.

Second, the brief discussion above refers to another feature relevant to explaining the differences between cases and adpositions, namely expectedness. Semantic roles coded by cases are integral parts of the given events and they can be seen as expected information, since their presence is implied by verbal semantics. On the other hand, peripheral roles most often represent additional information, which is less expected and cannot in many cases be inferred from the verb alone. As is typical of information

coding in general, new and unexpected information is highlighted by more linguistic substance than expected information, which may be claimed to make a contribution here as well; less expected roles bear more elaborate marking. This also has the consequence that adpositions need to be semantically more specific; they code information not retrievable from other cues. As discussed in the chapters of Kittilä and Ylikoski as well as Klavan et al., adpositions indeed appear in many cases where flagging has the function of highlighting an unexpected reading of a construction.

Third, the semantically more specific nature of adpositions is also manifested in optionality of marking and in their lower degrees of polysemy (this is relevant only if a language has both cases and adpositions). First, as shown by Kittilä (2005a), optional marking of arguments is more frequent with grammatical cases coding core roles, such as Agent and Patient, than with semantic cases and adpositions. Kittilä (2005a: 494) suggests that this follows, because overt marking is not needed in cases where the intended reading is retrievable from context; the deleted (case) marker does not carry any such information that could not be inferred otherwise. This is the case, for example, when it is clear from context which of the participants is the Agent and which the Patient, which, at least to some extent, explains the cross-linguistically frequent occurrence of Differential Object Marking. On the other hand, adpositions often express information that is not inferable from other cues, which makes their omission more limited, or even excludes it in many cases. For example, it is not clear which preposition has been omitted in a case such as *the child broke the vase ___ the rock*; at least *on*, *behind*, *with* and *without* yield felicitous interpretations.

Finally, cases and adpositions differ according to their number in a given language. The number of cases among languages varies from zero to as many as 25-30 cases depending on how cases are counted (cf., for example, Comrie & Polinsky 1998). On the other hand, the number of adpositions in a given language may be much higher and in many cases it is rather difficult to pinpoint the exact number of adpositions in a language, also because it is very hard to make a clear-cut distinction between serial verbs, coverbs, relational nouns and adpositions. This also contributes to the semantically more specific and less polysemous nature of adpositions. The number of the functions a prototypical case has to express is expectedly higher than the number of functions the average adposition has.

4. Animacy and semantic roles

In addition to their obligatory or optional nature, semantic roles vary according to whether they are more readily borne by animate or inanimate entities. Roles more readily borne by animate entities include Agent (including Affected Agent and Involuntary Agent), Recipient, Beneficiary, Maleficiary and Comitative, while roles such as Goal, Theme, Patient, Instrument and Location (with all possible subtypes) are more typically represented by inanimate entities. In this section, we will discuss this division of roles and the rationale behind it. We will first discuss the reasons for the

relationship between animacy and semantic roles. This will be followed by a discussion of the consequences which animacy has for our definition of semantic roles.

The unexpected (in)animacy of a role can be manifested in mainly two ways (the division is similar to that of Aristar (1997)):

1. A role cannot usually be borne by an animate or an inanimate participant.
2. A role can be borne by both animate and inanimate participants, but their coding varies (the conceptually more marked role bears more elaborate coding).

Examples of the first type are given in (5)-(8):

(5) Finnish (Uralic)

a. *äiti leipo-i kaku-n lapse-lle*
 mother.NOM bake-PST.3SG cake-ACC child-ALL

‘The mother baked a cake for the child.’

b. **/??äiti leipo-i kaku-n talo-lle*
 mother.NOM bake-PST.3SG cake-ACC house-ALL

(For: ‘The mother baked a cake for the house.’)

(6) Korean (isolate; Hak-Soo Kim, p.c.)

a. *ku-ka ku namcha-eke talli-ke ha-yess-ta*
 3SG-NOM DET man-DAT run-CAUS do-PST-DECL

‘He let the man run.’

- b. **ku-ka ku tol-eke ttele ha-yess-ta*
 3SG-NOM DET stone-DAT drop.PASS.CAUS do-PST-DECL
 (For: ‘He made the stone fall/he let the stone fall.’)

(7) Finnish (Uralic)

- a. *kuume/Kalle tappo-i Ville-n*
 fever.NOM/Kalle.NOM kill-PST.3SG Ville-ACC
 ‘Fever/Kalle killed Ville.’
- b. *Ville kuol-i kuumee-seen /*Kalle-en*
 Ville.NOM die-PST.3SG fever-ILL /Kalle-ILL
 ‘Ville died of fever/*Kalle.’
- c. *Kalle/*kuume tul-i tappa-nee-ksi*
 Kalle.NOM/fever.NOM come-PST.3SG kill-PTCP.ACT.PST-TRANSL
Ville-n
 Ville-ACC
 ‘Kalle/*fever accidentally killed Ville.’

(8) Kammu (Austro-Asiatic (Mon-Khmer); Svantesson 1983: 104)

- a. *rwàay p-háan tráak*
 tiger CAUS-kill buffalo
 ‘The tiger killed the buffalo.’

- b. **mìit* *p-háan* *tráak*
 knife CAUS-kill buffalo

(For: ‘The knife killed the buffalo.’)

In (5a) the allative codes the role of Recipient-Beneficiary. The allatively coded participant is the intended Recipient of the Theme. As can be expected based on the animacy of the participant and the role of (Recipient-)Beneficiary, this example is grammatical. On the other hand, in (5b), the allative marker is attached to an inanimate participant, which yields a pragmatically rather infelicitous construction. Inanimate participants are ruled out as Beneficiaries, because they are not capable of genuine benefaction. In (6), two instances of Causees are illustrated. In (6a), an animate participant is made to act and the example is felicitous. In (6b), in turn, the Causee is an inanimate participant incapable of volitional instigation of events, and the resulting construction is thus impossible. Examples in (7) are somewhat different from (5) and (6). As shown in (7a), Finnish allows both animate and inanimate Causers/Agents to surface as subjects in the nominative case, that is, animacy does not necessarily affect the coding of Agent in any way. However, the differences in animacy become relevant if we consider examples in (7b-c). These illustrate alternate ways of coding Agents in Finnish. In (7b), the coding of Force (inanimate causers of events such as fever) is illustrated. The illative coding of the causer is possible with Force, but not with a genuine Agent. Example (7c) in turn illustrates one of the IAC’s (Involuntary Agent Construction, see Kittilä (2005b) for a more detailed discussion) in Finnish. This

construction is used for highlighting a lower than expected degree of volitionality (and often a sense of carelessness) associated with an animate instigator. Because volitionality is not relevant to inanimate participants (they are not capable of volitional instigation), the construction illustrated in (7c) is incompatible with inanimate entities. Finally, in Kammu, Instruments cannot be cast into the role of Agent, which rules (8b) out.

Examples of type 2 (i.e. variation in coding correlating to conceptual markedness) are given in (9) and (10):

(9) Cora (Uto-Aztecan; Langacker 1977: 22; cf. Aristar 1997: 342)

a. *haitiri-hap^wa*

clouds-on

‘Above the clouds’

b. *wa-hap^wa* *?u-huci-m^wa*

them-on their-younger.brother-PL

‘On their younger brothers’

(10) Finnish (Uralic)

a. *kirja* *on* *pöydä-llä* /*pöydä-n päällä*

book.NOM be.PRS.3SG table-ADE /table-GEN on

‘The book is on the table.’

b. *kirja on !lapse-lla /lapse-n päällä*

book.NOM be.PRS.3SG child-ADE /child-GEN on

‘The book is on the child.’

(Note that the alternative *kirja on lapsella* would be seen as a perfectly normal expression of possession (‘the child has the book’) in (23b) below.)

Examples in (9) illustrate the coding of Static Location in Cora. In (9a), the role is borne by an inanimate participant, and the locative case affix is attached directly to the noun it modifies. In (9b), an animate entity serves as a Location, which has the consequence that the case marker can no longer attach directly to the noun, but it attaches to a pronoun which stands in apposition to the noun it refers to. The coded role is the same (Location) in both cases. In the Finnish examples, both case and adposition are possible with inanimate entities, but with animate entities, the only way of coding Location is to use an adposition. Adessive coding is possible and also very frequent with animate entities, but then the coded role is Possessor, not Location. Inanimate entities such as tables, rocks, lakes and buildings are very natural landmarks, because these entities are stable and thus ideal reference points for describing motion. On the other hand, animate entities are mobile and thus constitute less than ideal landmarks, which explains their more elaborate coding when they, contrary to our expectations, occur as Goals or Locations. The role is thus maintained in (9) and (10), but its coding varies according to animacy of the landmark in question. Similar cases are discussed

by Creissels and Mounole, Kittilä and Ylikoski, Klavan et al., and Luraghi in this volume.

In (5)-(10), we have briefly illustrated animacy-determined differences in the coding of certain semantic roles. The attested differences can be straightforwardly explained by the nature of events and their participants in the non-linguistic world. Only animate entities are capable of volitional and deliberate instigation of an event, which makes them the most natural and typical Agents of all entities. On the other hand, Instruments are physically manipulated for causing a change in another participant, while Goals and Locations are passive circumstants, which makes all of these roles typically inanimate. This division is expected and easily accounted for by the active vs. inactive nature of a given entity. An entity can, for example, be an Agent or a Recipient in an event only if it is somehow actively involved in it. On the other hand, Goals, Instruments and Themes, for example, remain inactive during the whole event; they are either manipulated somehow (Instruments, Themes and Patients), or they serve as some kind of background information (Goals and Locations), which explains the strong connection to inanimacy.

It is important to note, however, that semantic roles differ dramatically according to how strict the condition of (in)animacy is. Certain roles, such as Agent and Recipient are almost exclusively human (depending naturally on the exact definition of the role), while Goals, Locations and Patients can be borne by both animate and inanimate entities, though with these roles there is a tendency towards inanimacy. These differences follow from the nature of the roles in question. As noted above, Agents,

Recipients and in some cases Beneficiaries are more or less actively involved in events. Consequently, the bearers of these roles usually need to be animate. Inanimate entities are highly marked for these roles, because they lack the capability of volitional active participation. On the other hand, inanimacy is not a prerequisite for Patients, Locations or Goals, but both animate and inanimate entities are most often possible candidates for these roles, despite the aforementioned preference for inanimacy. This is especially evident for Patients, since highly animate entities are natural targets of many events, such as ‘the man killed the bear’, ‘John hit Bill’, or ‘the doctor healed the patient’. It has even been argued (see Næss 2003; 2007) that humans are more prototypical Patients than inanimate entities due to the higher degree of affectedness associated with human Patients. However, what makes inanimate entities typical Patients, Goals and Locations is their inability to initiate events volitionally. It is thus natural for them to bear roles that do not require any kind of active participation. This is not to say that inanimate entities could not serve as the causes of events, because they do so in many events such as ‘the storm destroyed the house’ or ‘the wind blew off my hat’. Animate entities, in turn, can participate in an event actively or inactively, but as only they are capable of active participation, roles such as Agent, Recipient and Beneficiary are more natural for them. The distribution of animacy between different roles is very relevant to the chapters by Creissels and Mounole, Kittilä and Ylikoski, Klavan et al., Luraghi, Sirola-Belliard and Västi in this volume.

The relation between animacy and semantic roles can be discussed from another perspective as well. As has been noted numerous times above, animate entities tend to

bear certain roles, while inanimate entities are typically associated with other roles. In addition, there are many roles that can, at least in principle, be distinguished from each other based solely, or at least primarily, on animacy. Examples are provided in (11)-(14):

(11) Sinhala (Indo-European; Gair 1990: 16)

a. *lameya wælikandak hæduwa*
 child.NOM sand.hill.INDF make.PST
 ‘The child makes a sandpile.’

b. *hulangeŋ wælikandak hæduna*
 wind.INS sand.hill.INDF make.PASS.PST
 ‘A sandpile formed (because of the wind).’

(12) Lezgian (Northeast Caucasian; Haspelmath 1993: 292; Moor 1985: 112)

a. *zamara-di get'e xa-na*
 Zamira-ERG pot break-AOR
 ‘Zamira broke the pot.’

b. *ničayval-di ruš q'ena*
 disease-ERG girl killed
 ‘The disease killed the girl.’

(13) Korku (Austro-Asiatic (Munda); Nagaraja 1999: 46, 97)

a. *raja ra:ma-ke sita-ke ji-khe-nec*

king.NOM Ram-OBJ Sita-OBJ give-PST-PERS

‘The king gave Sita to Ram.’

b. *iñj ini-koro-ken mya kama:y-Ten Di-ga:w-en*

I this-man-OBJ one work-ABL that-village-DAT/ALL

kul-khe-nej

send-PST-PERS

‘I sent this man on a work to that village.’

(14) Lule Saami (Uralic; personal knowledge)

Biehtár rája-j breva-v åhpaddji-j/Divtasvuodna-j

B. send-PST.3SG letter-ACC teacher-ILL/Divtasvuodna-ILL

‘Peter sent the letter to the teacher/Divtasvuodna.’

Examples in (11) and (12) illustrate the coding of animate and inanimate instigators of events. In Sinhala, animate Agents bear nominative coding, while inanimate instigators appear in the instrumental case. In Lezgian, animacy is not relevant to Agent coding, because both animate and inanimate Agents bear ergative marking. Examples (13) and (14), in turn, illustrate the marking of animate and inanimate Goals. In Korku, animacy determines the coding of Goals; animate Goals *sensu lato* are coded identically to (animate) Patients, while inanimate Goals bear more peripheral dative/allative coding.

In Lule Saami, both animate and inanimate Goals occur in the illative case, which renders animacy irrelevant in this regard.

The question that unavoidably arises is whether we are dealing with one role or two in cases such as (11)-(14). To put it another way, should we speak of a single role of Agent and Goal that can, if necessary, be divided into two based on animacy, or should we rather distinguish between the roles more explicitly and speak of distinct roles, such as Agent vs. Force and Goal vs. Recipient? There is support for both of these views.

On the one hand, data from languages such as Lezgian and Lule Saami, where the semantic differences between the roles are not manifested formally, suggest that we are dealing with single roles with slightly different manifestations. We may add that the roles share common features, which makes it plausible to view them as different manifestations of a single (macro)role. In (11) and (12), we are dealing with participants that are responsible for instigating the denoted event, while (13) and (14) exemplify the coding of participants that serve as the endpoints of an act of transfer. Moreover, the two instances of the roles in question can often be distinguished based on animacy, which makes distinct coding redundant.

On the other hand, languages like Sinhala and Korcu provide us with support for the opposing view. In these languages, animacy directly affects the coding of Agent and Goal, and animate and inanimate instances of these roles are given different formal treatment. At first, this kind of explicit distinction may seem redundant, because, as noted previously, animacy usually distinguishes between the two different instances of these roles. However, despite the features shared by animate and inanimate Agents and

Goals (*sensu lato*), there are also evident differences between the roles. These differences are most striking for Goals. Inanimate Goals are mere endpoints of transfer, and they cannot be considered active at any phase of an event. Animate Goals, for their part, are best viewed as Recipients in (13) and (14). They are not mere passive endpoints of transfer, but they actively partake in the denoted event by accepting the transfer. A secure answer to this problem of definition lies outside the scope of the present chapter, but since many of the contributions of this volume deal with similar issues, it is important to acknowledge this potential problem (see e.g. Kittilä and Ylikoski, this volume).

Lastly, it is important to note that animacy is not necessarily an inherent feature of an entity, even though entities in the non-linguistic world are typically either animate or inanimate. For example, tables, rocks and books are inanimate, while women, men and children are animate entities. However, a number of entities can be regarded as both animate and inanimate depending on how they are conceptualized. Typical examples of these include institutions, such as schools, companies and parliaments. For example, a noun such as *school* can refer to the institution (*schools are closed*), a building (*this school will be torn down*) or to the pupils and teachers of the institution (*our school did well in the competition*). As a result, it does not do justice to the noun *school* to be defined either as animate or inanimate, but its “animacy” varies depending on context, and the formal treatment of these nouns varies accordingly. Consider:

(15) Finnish (Uralic)

a. *lapsi käy koulu-a*
 child.NOM attend.PRS.3SG school-PTV

‘The child goes to school.’

b. *presidentti kirjoitti kirje-n koulu-lle*
 president.NOM write-PST.3SG letter-ACC school-ALL

‘The president wrote a letter to the school.’

c. *kaupunki rakensi uude-n koulu-n*
 city.NOM build-PST.3SG new-ACC school-ACC

‘The city built a new school.’

In (15), the noun *koulu* ‘school’ is used in different contexts, and what is important here is that its animacy varies drastically according to its use. In (15a), school is seen as an institution, something that children attend. In (15b), the noun refers to the people in the school, that is, the reading of the sentence is ‘the president wrote a letter to the pupils and teachers of the school’. This follows since inanimate entities are infelicitous as genuine Recipients. Finally, in (15c) the noun refers to school in the sense of a building. The anomalous behavior of nouns with varying animacy is discussed thoroughly by Song in this volume and also the chapter by Västi touches upon the topic.

5. Case and animacy

In the previous section, we showed that certain roles are, for semantic reasons, borne either by animate or inanimate entities. In this section, we will discuss the preferences of certain case markers to co-occur either with animate or inanimate arguments. On many occasions the infelicity of a case marker with an animate or an inanimate entity is at least to some extent explained by animacy and semantic roles, but unlike, for example, (5)-(8), the result is not an ungrammatical construction. The discussion in this section is largely motivated by Aristar's (1997) study of referential hierarchies and marking of peripheral roles. We will first illustrate typical combinations of animacy and case, which will be followed by an examination of cases, where (in)animacy blocks the occurrence of a case marker.

First, there are case markers that are best regarded as neutral; they can attach to both animate and inanimate entities. Typical examples include grammatical cases, such as accusative and ergative, illustrated in (16) from Hindi:²

(16) Hindi (Indo-European; Mohanan 1994: 70, 74, 75, 79)

a. *ilaa-ne haar-ko ut^haayaa*

Ila-ERG necklace-ACC lift.PRF

'Ila lifted the necklace.'

² The occurrence of ergative and accusative case markers is not completely neutral, but there are certain restrictions.

b. *ravii-ne davaaai pii daalii*

Ravi-ERG medicine.NOM drink pour.PRF

‘Ravi (deliberately) drank up the medicine.’

c. *raam-ne ravii-ko piitaa*

Ram-ERG Ravi-ACC beat.PRF

‘Ram beat Ravi.’

d. *havaa-ne patte bik^her dyie t^he*

wind-ERG leaves.NOM scatter give.PRF be.PST

‘The wind had scattered the leaves.’

As shown above, accusative and ergative case markers attach to both animate and inanimate arguments in Hindi, that is, the occurrence of these markers is not determined by animacy. This is expected, since the accusative and ergative both exemplify so-called grammatical cases, whose presence is determined formally; accusative codes O and ergative A in many languages. This has the consequence that the two case forms appear readily with both animate and inanimate entities; formal requirements override possible semantic restrictions.

Second, there are case markers that attach only to either inanimate or animate arguments (or at least these are very strong preferences). Examples are given in (17)-(19):

(17) Tsakhur (Northeast Caucasian; Schulze 1997: 58)

a. *adam-e jizr^z alebt'e*
 man-ERG bridge.III.ABS III.destroy.PST
 'The man destroyed the bridge.'

b. *dama-n jizr^z alebt'e*
 river-ERG bridge.III.ABS III.destroy.PST
 'The river destroyed the bridge.'

(18) Sinhala (Indo-European; Gair & Paolillo 1997: 32)

a. *siri gunpaale*(-te) gæhuwa*
 Siri Gunapala-ACC hit
 'Siri hit Gunapala.'

b. *mame ee pote(*-we) kiyewwa*
 I that book(*-ACC) read
 'I read that book.'

(19) Yidiny (Pama-Nyungan; Dixon 1977: 59f., 110f.)

a. *wagu:dya bunya:-nda wawa:-dyi-n*
 man woman-DAT look.at-ANTIP-PRS
 'The man is looking at the woman.'

b. *wagu:ja gunda:-ji-n (jugi:-l) galba:n-da*
 man cut-ANTIP-PRS (tree-LOC) axe-INS

‘The man is cutting a tree with an axe.’

c. *nayu* *balmbi:ndja* *wawa:dijnu*

I grasshopper.LOC see.ANTIP.PST

‘I saw the grasshopper.’

d. *nayu* *balmbi:nda* *wawa:dijnu*

I grasshopper.DAT see.ANTIP.PST

‘I saw the grasshopper.’

In Tsakhur, there are two ergative affixes employed according to the animacy of the Agent. Consequently, in order to be an Agent it does not suffice for an argument to be marked in a certain way, but animacy must be considered as well. In Sinhala, for its part, the accusative affix can attach only to animate arguments, as shown by the ungrammaticality of (18b). Unlike Hindi, the markers in question cannot thus be seen as pure grammatical cases, but animacy is relevant to their use. The examples from Yidiny are somewhat different from those in (17) and (18). In Yidiny, both animate and inanimate Os appear in the zero-marked absolutive case in non-derived constructions. However, the differences in animacy become relevant in antipassive constructions. In the antipassive, the dative marks animate Os, while a locative marker is attached to inanimate Os. The dative is very rare with inanimate Os and the locative with animate Os. It is also worth noting that lower animates are between higher animates and inanimates also formally; they allow both dative and locative marking. An interesting example of animacy-driven case marking is discussed by Sirola-Belliard

in this volume. She shows that the Finnish comitative case is actually quite rare, or often utterly ungrammatical with higher animates, even though we might think that higher animates are the most likely entities to receive comitative case marking.

Third, it is possible that a marker can attach to both animate and inanimate arguments, but special mechanisms (such as an additional marker) are needed for rendering the less natural combination possible. Examples are given in (20) and (21):

(20) Yukulta (Tangkic; Keen 1983: 248)

a. *ɲitʰ-iya-kanta kuralata pulmpara*

fire-ERG-TR.PST scatter.IND grasshopper.ABS

‘The fire scattered the grasshoppers.’

b. *palata-lkanta ɲawuwa tujal-ulu-ya*

hit.IND-3PL.TR.PST dog.ABS stick-COM-ERG

‘The stick hit the dog.’ (lit. ‘They having a stick, hit the dog.’)

(21) Kuvi (Dravidian; Aristar 1996: 215)

a. *āyana-ki*

woman-DAT

‘to the woman’

b. *ilu ta-ki*

house P-DAT

‘to the house’

c. *āyani* *taŋ-a*

woman.GEN P-LOC

‘at the woman’s place’

d. *ilut-a*

house-LOC

‘at the house’

Yukulta resembles Hindi in that the ergative affix can occur with both animate and inanimate arguments. However, unlike Hindi, in Yukulta a comitative affix is needed for attaching an ergative affix to an inanimate argument (Aristar (1997) labels these kinds of markers as bridge morphemes). In Kuvi, the dative affix attaches directly to animate arguments, as in (21a), while with inanimate arguments an adpositional element is needed. The opposite holds for the locative, since a special mechanism is needed for animate arguments (see also (9) and (10)). The kind of distribution of the markers illustrated above is easily accounted for by the relation holding between animacy and semantic roles. The examples from Kuvi are very illustrative in this respect. The dative affix occurs readily with animate arguments, while a special mechanism is necessary for inanimate arguments. On the other hand, inanimate entities are more typical landmarks, for which reason locational markers readily occur with them, while a special marker is needed for Animate Locations (see also (9) and (10)). Similar cases are discussed by Creissels and Mounole, Kittilä and Ylikoski, Klavan et al. and Luraghi in this volume.

‘The child ran to the school.’

In (22)-(24), a single case marker can attach to both animate and inanimate arguments without any (clear) preferences or risk of ungrammaticality. However, (22)-(24) differ crucially from (11)-(14) in that in (22)-(24), the role coded by the marker varies according to animacy. In Kalkatungu, the same marker codes both Agents and Instruments. In Finnish, the adessive case codes Location with inanimate arguments, as in (23a), while it codes Possessor with animate arguments, as shown in (23b) (it also codes Instrument in favorable conditions). In Japanese, the dative clitic *ni* can mark both Recipients/Beneficiaries (animate arguments) and Goals (inanimate arguments). Further examples of similar cases are not hard to find. For example, Comitative and Instrument (see Stolz et al. 2006 for a detailed discussion of this) and Beneficiary and Indirect Cause (see Kittilä & Zúñiga 2010: 22f.) are marked by the same element in many languages. All of these instances of case polysemy are easily accounted for by referring to animacy. The roles that receive identical coding share common features, but there is no real risk of ambiguity since animacy most often resolves potential ambiguity. For example, the basic function of the Finnish adessive case is to code Location *sensu lato* (on top of or in the vicinity of an entity). However, as noted above, animate entities are less than ideal landmarks, which has the (diachronic) result that the adessive codes Possessor with animate arguments. Possession can be conceptualized as Location in the sphere of control or domain of possession of an animate entity, which explains quite well this instance of polysemy (locationals have similar functions also in

other languages; see e.g. Stassen 2009). Another, semantically rather illustrative example is provided by the polysemy of Beneficiary and Indirect Cause. Beneficiaries can be seen as indirect causes of events in that an Agent would not have performed an action without the presence of the indirectly affected participant. In the event that the indirect causer is inanimate, it cannot be a Beneficiary, but we are left with indirect causation only. In these cases, the identically coded roles share at least one important feature, but they differ in other respects. For example, in the case of location/possession polysemy, both inanimate and animate participants can be conceptualized as Locations, but animate participants are also Possessors capable of using the entity in their possession for a specific purpose.

6. Contents of this volume

The present volume includes eleven subsequent chapters. All chapters approach the interplay of cases, animacy and semantic roles from different perspectives, but the chapters can be divided into five groups according to their primary focus. The chapters in the volume deal with languages from different parts of the world, but special attention is paid to Uralic languages. The topics discussed are:

1. Semantic roles and animacy
2. Semantic roles and cases vs. adpositions

3. Animacy and case
4. Theoretical issues
5. Diachrony of case

Each of these groups are briefly elaborated below. Incidentally, the chapters in the first two parts deal more with Uralic languages, while other parts are more diverse in nature.

First, two of the chapters, Kittilä and Ylikoski, and Västi, deal directly with animacy and semantic roles. Kittilä and Ylikoski discuss the coding of Recipient, Goal and Vicinal Goal ('to the vicinity of a landmark') in the six major branches of Uralic languages spoken in Europe. The authors show that animacy makes an important contribution to the coding of directional roles in Uralic. Recipients are animate, Goals typically inanimate, while participants labeled as Vicinal Goals are typically, yet not necessarily, animate. The coding of Vicinal Goal is typically more elaborate than the coding of the two other roles, and one of the explanations the authors propose for this is that animacy of the landmark and the markedness related to this are significant here. Västi's chapter examines the senses of the allative case in a verbless construction of Finnish. The chapter makes an important contribution to our understanding of case, since the meaning accorded to the examined initial allatives cannot be inferred from verbal semantics. The author limits the discussion to allatives with an animate referent and shows that the allative can possess functions it does not have in canonical clauses with a verb.

The following two chapters' primary focus can be claimed to be on the use of cases vs. adpositions in the coding of case. The chapter by Klavan et al. deals with the coding of Location by cases and adpositions in Estonian. The chapter shows that case forms (here the adessive case) are used for coding expected and unmarked scenes, while Estonian resorts to adpositional coding mostly when the described scene is somewhat less natural. The findings of the chapter lend more support to the views of Kittilä and Ylikoski, and also Luraghi; more elaborate coding is necessary if the denoted scene deviates from our expectations. Adpositions are semantically more specific than case markers (see e.g. Comrie 1986), which accounts well for this distribution of marking. Sirola-Belliard in turn discusses the differences between the comitative case and the postposition *kanssa* 'with' in Finnish. The chapter shows, partly contrary to our expectations, that these two elements, both of which can under favorable conditions code Accompaniment, are not semantically identical, but they cover different functional areas.

Thirdly, there are two chapters that focus primarily on the interplay of animacy and case (and adpositions). Creissels and Mounole deal with animacy and spatial cases in Basque. The authors show that Basque follows the cross-linguistic tendency that animate entities are less ideal landmarks than inanimate entities. Song's chapter, in turn, examines the so-called Organization/Document Construction in Korean. These are constructions in which an argument referring to an organization or a document receives locative coding (which is not typical of animate arguments), but the constituent in question nevertheless displays features typical of subjects. As such, these

entities are not animate, but organizations consist of animate beings and documents are created by animate beings, which explains the somewhat unexpected formal behavior of these arguments.

The next three contributions, i.e. the chapters by Lestrade, Næss and Zúñiga deal with issues that are best considered theoretical in nature. Lestrade's chapter challenges the definition of case by arguing that Dutch has spatial case. The author bases his argumentation on structural positions of case markers and the infelicity of the Dutch spatial cases with human landmarks. Næss' chapter also questions our understanding of case, but from a somewhat different perspective. Case is typically defined as a marker that can be shown to have clearly defined semantic functions, such as marking Agent, Patient and Recipient (see also (1) from Japanese). According to this definition, Vaeakau-Taumako, an Austronesian (Polynesian) language of the Solomons, does not have case, but the language has markers that share certain common features with less controversial case markers. Næss' chapter explores, in particular, the relationship between case marking and markers of pragmatic salience and, as a consequence, the role of pragmatics in case-marking more generally. The chapter thus contributes to our understanding of the interplay of semantics and pragmatics as regards the definition of case. Zúñiga's chapter discusses the coding of Beneficiaries across languages and proposes a semantico-pragmatic representation of benefactive situations. In so doing, the chapter explores the intralinguistic and crosslinguistic generalizations related to the fact that Beneficiaries can be adjuncts, objects and even subjects. The chapter

illustrates different syntactic realizations of Beneficiaries and shows how they relate to the meaning of the construction.

The volume closes with two chapters dealing with the development of directional (case) markers. Ylikoski's chapter concerns the diachrony of cases in the Uralic languages. In surveying the history of nearly thirty different directional case markers in the European branches of Uralic, he seeks to resolve a number of mismatches between the traditional tenets of historical Uralistics and the contemporary typological understanding of the development of cases. On a long continuum of etymologically transparent and opaque cases within inflectional paradigms of various sizes, special attention is given to the system-internal roles of semantic functions of individual cases, and consequently, an increasing awareness of diachronic processes among local cases also adds to our synchronic understanding of the mutual relations of the various semantic roles they encode. The chapter by Luraghi has much in common with Ylikoski (and also Creissels and Mounole), but the focus lies on the Romance languages. Luraghi shows that animate landmarks constitute marked Directions and bear more elaborate marking. Depending on the language, different strategies have developed into markers of animate Directions. These include, for example, comitatives and words that have originally meant 'home/house'.

Abbreviations

| | | | |
|-------|---|------|---|
| 1, 3 | first, third person | IND | indicative |
| III | a noun class | INDF | indefinite |
| A | agent-like argument of canonical transitive verb | INF | infinitive |
| ABL | ablative | INS | instrumental |
| ABS | absolutive | LOC | locative |
| ACC | accusative | NOM | nominative |
| ACT | active | O | patient-like argument of canonical transitive verb |
| ADE | adessive | OBJ | object |
| ALL | allative | PASS | passive |
| ANTIP | antipassive | PERS | person |
| AOR | aorist | PL | plural |
| CAUS | causative | PRF | perfect |
| COM | comitative | PRS | present |
| DAT | dative | PST | past |
| DECL | declarative | PTCP | participle |
| DET | determiner | PTV | partitive |
| ERG | ergative | SG | singular |
| GEN | genitive | TOP | topic |
| ILL | illative | TR | transitive |

TRANSL translative

Acknowledgements

The editors of this book thank the Academy of Finland (grant number 1127724) for providing funding for this study and for the workshop *Case, Animacy and Semantic Roles* held in Helsinki on August 26, 2009. We also thank Typological Studies in Language editor Spike Gildea for accepting our volume for publication in the TSL series as well as a large and dedicated group of our esteemed colleagues who helped us with the reviewing process of the chapters in this book.

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